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EVOLUTION OF AN ENTERPRISE INFORMATION
SYSTEM TOWARD OMNI-CHANNEL RETAILING: A
CASE STUDY
Varin Francis, Bryant University
Chaudhury Abhijit, Bryant University
ABSTRACT
This case study covers the evolution of an enterprise information system at a sportswear
firm. Over time, the sportswear industry has moved from a single channel to multiple channels
and is now progressing toward an omni-channel system for better serving their customers. This
required a corresponding evolution in the firm’s information technology (IT) systems. But
changes in an IT system do not work in isolation. To get the most from their new IT platform, the
firm discovered the need to redesign their organizational structure, redefine IT’s role, and do
strategic workforce planning. The paper describes, under fictitious names, how the firm
negotiated these challenges as it moved towards a new IT platform that would enable omnichannel offering to its customers.
Keywords: Enterprise Information Architecture, Multiple Channel, Omni Channel
INTRODUCTION
On Monday, January 11, 2010, Warren Prescott, the incoming CEO of White Mountain
Sportswear (WMS), had a long meeting with board members, many of whom were members of
the LeBeau family that started and continued to have majority ownership in the publicly traded
firm. Mr. LeBeau, the current CEO, made Mr. Prescott aware of the firm’s history that spanned
over a century. Mr. LeBeau emphasized that WMS always considered itself an integral part of
the local community and had continued to use the same buildings and manufacturing shops that
it started with. According to him, there was a “social compact” between WMS, its employees, its
shareholders, and its vendors. They were like a family, and WMS had avoided any layoffs in its
long history. Most of the executives hailed from the same town and went to the same colleges,
and WMS generously contributed to the public institutions of the town such as schools, libraries,
colleges, and parks.
According to Mr. LeBeau, WMS’s sales growth had recently become anemic. Their ecommerce venture was not meeting expectations. Sales in the e-commerce channel seemed to
come at the expense of sales in the other two channels: stores and catalog sales. The LeBeau
family felt that it was time for new blood that had experience with the retail revolution sweeping
the world-hence their recruitment of Mr. Prescott as the new CEO. Mr. Prescott was hired from a
current competitor of WMS, so he had some ideas as to what ailed the firm. Mr. LeBeau wanted
to know Mr. Prescott’s opinion of the current retail scenario. “Every generation has its retail
revolution,” remarked Mr. Prescott. “It has a lot to do with technology, a new generation of
customers who are looking for something different and firms who don’t get it right” Sarker
(2000).
At the end of the meeting, Mr. Prescott felt that the firm needed to be revitalized with a
new information technology (IT) platform. But he also knew that, as in a chess game, the major
1
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pieces must move in concert with minor pieces to end in success. So, new IT alone would
contribute little. The current CIO of the firm, Mr. Peter Stingley, was professionally known to
him. Mr. Stingley previously worked as a CIO in a large retail firm and had a good reputation;
Mr. Prescott felt that he was the right man now (Leavitt, 1965).
History: 1890 to 2010
Following the immigration of French-Canadians during the 19th century, Henri LeBeau
began manufacturing sportswear in the late 1890s. LeBeau’s love of the outdoors and his
background working in the textile industry in New England provided him with the necessary
understanding and expertise to establish such an enterprise. His small shop in Southbridge,
Massachusetts, provided him with ample space to produce a small variety of apparel. LeBeau’s
products gained recognition from outdoor enthusiasts as affordable and of exceptional quality.
Within a few short years, his new company had grown considerably, and it was able to
sustain profitability during the Depression and into the 1930s. LeBeau moved to a larger facility
in Southbridge and doubled his staff, enabling the company to have a regional impact. The
company was given the name White Mountain Sportswear, reflecting LeBeau’s love and passion
for the White Mountains of New Hampshire, a prime location for activities such as skiing and
hiking. WMS utilized mail-order catalog sales to expand their reach throughout New England.
By the 1970s, WMS had increased their product line substantially to serve markets beyond
just outdoor enthusiasts. Many workers in the New England fishing and construction industries
were using WMS’s products. In response, WMS established a workwear division to focus on this
new market opportunity. Mark Spencer, Assistant Vice President of sales, was named to manage
the new division and promoted to Vice President. Under his leadership and working closely with
LeBeau, the workwear division steadily grew into a viable market segment for WMS (Pereira &
Sousa, 2004).
The 1980s and 1990s marked a time of significant growth for WMS. They had expanded to
over twenty retail stores in the US and four in Europe. In 1989, they suddenly faced a 300%
increase in call volume during the Christmas holiday season, which had the potential to swamp
the call center with order and customer service inquiries. WMS responded by purchasing a
warehouse that was wired as a call center. From then on, six weeks before the annual busy
season, WMS would hire temporary workers to operate the phones. The annex to the main call
center was dormant most of the year and only used during the busy season. Due to significant
growth and to address technological changes, WMS also introduced a mainframe computer
system to manage inventory, accounting, order processing, and fulfillment Zhe (2018). Through
careful planning and strategic decision making, WMS achieved the goal of improving the speed
and efficiency of their business operations as their sales increased.
WMS’s growth began to level in the late 1990s. To address the increase in volume and the
rising cost of labor, WMS moved most of their manufacturing overseas. Plants in China and the
Philippines were added to the original factory in Southbridge, MA. The change in approach to
include manufacturing abroad presented challenges WMS had not anticipated or understood.
Time zone differences allowed extended hours for manufacturing to take place, but impacted
communication between the headquarters and the satellite plants. WMS began to realize the
savings in labor they had anticipated, but some early quality issues had negative effects on their
brand’s position in the market, with a negative impact on revenue and sales. Once the issues
were addressed, the sales and revenue numbers recovered quickly. WMS was faced with
understanding the culture and society in the new plant locations. Initially, this led to
2
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misunderstandings between those managing the offshore plants and the management stateside. It
took a while, but once a highly collaborative partnership between the management teams had
been established, the working relationship began to iron itself out. In the end, it took WMS much
longer than expected to get the overseas plant operations performing at an anticipated level,
requiring the management team to be focused exclusively on this task at the expense of other
business initiatives (Wells, 2013).
Upon the retirement of Peter LeBeau, the board of directors decided to hire a CEO from
outside the company to address the issues facing WMS. They chose Warren Prescott, who had
been the COO of Harper Actionwear, WMS’s main competitor. Harper Actionwear was more
progressive in their management approach than WMS had traditionally been, and the board felt
Mr. Prescott would introduce necessary changes that would benefit the company. During the last
few years of his tenure, Mr. LeBeau had brought in several senior executives from outside,
including Marcy Henderson as Chief Finance Officer and Nancy Sturgis as Chief Marketing
Officer, both around the year 2004. While the workwear division came under Ms. Sturgis, the
sportswear division continued to operate under the Chief Operating Officer, Gail Smith. Elise
LeBeau, the youngest daughter of Peter LeBeau, was promoted to manage manufacturing. Peter
Stingley was hired in 2005 as head of the IT department shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BEFORE 2010
Taking Stock
In his first few days, Mr. Prescott met with senior managers of the firm. He realized from
these meetings and from competing against WMS in his previous job that the firm continued to
enjoy many strengths. They had a very reputable brand, legendary customer service, and
warranty policies that were the most liberal in the industry. For their size, they had one of the
largest call center operations in the industry, whose employees were all natives of Massachusetts.
WMS often received awards for its customer service quality. Its operating margins were healthy,
but its market share had progressively reduced with the entry of new firms and the e-commerce
revolution that Amazon exemplified (Keil & Mahring, 2010).
Employees of WMS were conscious that change was necessary but were apprehensive as
to how it might affect them individually. The esprit de corps that Mr. Prescott sensed among the
3
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managers, most of whom grew up in the same town, meant that if inspired by the right strategy
they would deliver outstanding performance. With a successful e-commerce operation coupled to
their retail stores in Europe, there was a great opportunity to go beyond the US market.
WMS’s weakness as compared to its competitors was a relatively outdated IT platform, but
Mr. Stingley had accomplished some notable changes in his last five years with WMS. The new
CFO and COO who had joined along with Mr. Stingley were enthusiastic supporters of the IT
changes being implemented. They installed SAP systems that allowed integration of their
operations with vendors all over the globe. This led to integration of WMS’s supply chain with
its vendors’ supply chain systems. The store managers had the benefit of access to current data
about product availability in their central warehouse in Sturbridge, and the procurement
managers had current data on stocks in stores and warehouses Applegate and Montealgere
(2018).
While WMS’s products were first rate, Mr. Prescott realized that no one spoke much about
“customer experience,” the buzzword sweeping the retail world. Consumers now expected an
excellent online shopping experience with order fulfillment and delivery within days. Consumer
preference had changed. They expected an organization to know them well and tailor products to
anticipate their future needs. Shoppers’ experience had now become the driver of competition,
and that was not reflected in WMS’s organizational structure, systems, or culture. Their
marketing focus continued to be on product quality and service, even though because of
outsourcing most retail firms acquired their products from similar sources, which made
differentiation harder to attain.
Managers were mostly employees with over 20 years of service at WMS, often working in
the same department and in the same product line. They had a strong tradition of doing
everything in-house to ensure the quality that their customers expected. Few managers showed
interest outside their individual lines of work and departments. With the siloed outlook of the
managers and lack of cross-functional or product experience, Mr. Prescott wondered how much
of the promised process integration by SAP really led to a more dynamic decision-making
environment in the firm.
E-commerce Channel
During the Internet boom of the late 1990s, WMS decided to utilize a website to expose
their catalog. They set up an office in New York and started an e-commerce channel from that
office, using a local firm to run the website and e-commerce platform. Unfortunately, the firm
went bankrupt in the 2000 dotcom bust. WMS’s own IT department managed the website for
some time before another e-commerce specialty firm was hired. Order processing in this channel
was still strictly handled by phone or emails from the New York office to their distribution center
in Sturbridge.
WMS prided themselves on high customer touch and service and maintained a
conservative approach in their implementation of the online channel. This decision was due to
the older technology WMS continued to use, which was in the process of being replaced by SAP
systems related to fulfillment and warehousing. WMS did not consider themselves an early
adopter of new technology in a time when most executives were not sure business would thrive
in the new online e-commerce world. Eventually more organizations began to drive business to
the Internet, attempting to keep pace. WMS did not pursue increased investment in their online
channel due to other higher-priority business initiatives. As a result, WMS’s presence had not
significantly changed since their first offerings, and their competition moved past them. What
4
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once was an early advantage for WMS now placed them behind their competition. WMS
recognized the signs of customer erosion due to their weaker position in the new online economy.
WMS maintained the website for years but invested no business focus or commitment to
develop it as a valid marketing channel, resulting in little functionality on the site that was of
interest to consumers. The e-commerce share of their business initially grew fast to around 20%
by 2004, and then saw little improvement. Much of the sales in the e-commerce channel came at
the expense of existing catalog sales, and that did not generate much enthusiasm at the head
office. Their competitors’ e-commerce share was close to 50%, showing the potential for
improvement if they could get this channel right. The channel had seen three managers in 10
years, who all came from the sportswear and workwear divisions and went back to their old
departments. The pricing decisions for the e-commerce channel were made by the division
managers of sportswear and workwear. Often, the retail price and the web price were the same,
but with the added cost of shipping, the final price to the web customer was higher. So, while the
e-commerce channel manager was responsible for the channel sales, most decisions were out of
their scope of authority. For changes in pages and layouts, the e-commerce channel manager had
to route their requests through the product managers, which added delays that they could ill
afford during the brief holiday season. When it came to poor sales in e-commerce, there was no
single point of accountability in the whole firm. Their SAP FI/CO (financial and control) system
was configured to have two sales areas for the two product divisions, for which their individual
profitability and revenue were computed, and so numbers for e-commerce were at best estimates.
Current estimates of sales data in the e-commerce channel were only available at the end of each
month.
One of the persistent complaints of web customers was late deliveries. To improve the
situation, WMS set up a warehouse in the New York area that stored most common items
ordered. This allowed quick deliveries, as shorter delivery times were becoming a critical
differentiator due to initiatives launched by Amazon. This warehouse was not part of the SAP
system, and the warehouse management systems at the New York warehouse and their main
distribution center in Sturbridge were from different vendors. The warehouse logic for systems
supporting retail sales is very different from that supporting e-commerce. In retail sales
distribution centers, goods move in and out on at least a pallet basis. In contrast, in the ecommerce world, items are picked and shipped a few at a time. The logic of storage in ecommerce warehouses is not pallet based, but as bundles of a few items irregularly laid out near
the packaging section, according to the frequency of ordering. A single order in e-commerce may
have three different items with a quantity of one each, and the picking logic needs to
disaggregate the order first, collect each item separately, and aggregate the items into a single
package, which then must be handed out to a shipper. In contrast, in the retail store, all this “last
mile” activity is done by the customers themselves. For e-commerce warehousing, this kind of
picking and packing activity leads to either expensive labor or expensive automation, and small
scale operations such as WMS are at a competitive disadvantage against firms like Amazon that
enjoy scale economies. When WMS’s products were not available at the New York warehouse,
which happened frequently, they were obtained from the distribution center in Sturbridge, which
added to delays. Moreover, these sales were not credited to the e-commerce channel, which led
to even poorer sales figures for the new channel.
Over time, WMS had adopted Google Analytics to track and understand the issues with the
new channel. The Google search ranking for their products was lower than their competitors’.
They occasionally hired search engine specialists to assist in their web design. It would work for
5
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some time, but when the search engine algorithms changed, the gains would be lost. Traffic came
from all over the US, but most of the sales were from cities on the East Coast, which showed that
WMS was failing to enhance its customer base. Sources of traffic were weighted towards social
media and various search engines, but WMS had scant social media presence and tracking.
Products that were popular over the web were not often the same products that were popular in
retail stores, pointing toward different demographic groups in the two channels. The site suffered
from poor conversion rates, with many pages having high bounce rates. The sourcing devices
were increasingly cell phones, and the page load times were often poor on these devices, leading
to high cart abandonment rates.
The New Vision
Mr. Prescott started selling the vision of WMS offering the most “outstanding and
delightful multi-channel experience to its customers” in the sportswear industry. A customer’s
experience is made up of individual touch points, over a variety of channels (Figure 2) that need
to seamlessly connect, allowing them to pick up where they left off on one channel and continue
the experience on another. Only then could an experience be classed as delightful.

FIGURE 2
MULTIPLE TOUCH POINTS WITH CUSTOMERS
Mr. Prescott started emphasizing systems, structure, and solidarity as enabling factors for
achieving the vision. WMS needed a new IT platform that was in tune with the times. In Mr.
Stingley, he had a competent manager who could lead the initiative. Changes in organizational
structure were needed to best use the potentiality of the IT platform. He wanted to develop a
structure made up of individual organizational units where accountability and authority were
6
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closely aligned and a reporting system that provided current performance numbers for these
organizational units. Dealing with a 100-year-old company that had fiercely loyal employees, he
wanted to assure them that while much change would happen in individual roles and functions,
there would be no layoffs. He knew that he would face strong resistance in implementing the
new structure and systems from multiple stakeholders of the firm, such as senior managers, front
line employees, IT staff and vendors, and an impatient financial community. He decided to
anticipate their reactions and take early steps to defuse them.
Over many meetings, it was decided that there should be two managers for the two product
divisions and two separate managers for the two channels. SAP allowed sales areas as
combinations of divisions and channels, and with two channels and two divisions, four sales
areas could be tracked by the SAP system. Therefore, the revenue and profitability of the four
sales areas could be tracked in real time simultaneously. Pricing decisions would be made jointly
by the concerned channel and division managers as in a matrix organization structure. All four
division and channel managers would be reporting to the Chief Marketing Officer (Figure 3),
who would have a dashboard showing weekly and monthly sales and margin data for various
product lines and channels and combinations thereof. There would be dedicated employees for
the two channels, and new experienced employees would be recruited for the New York office.
WMS had used Accenture for their SAP implementation, and they would act as consultants
when WMS upgraded their e-commerce channel. Key performance indicators were identified for
the e-commerce channel, such as sales, traffic, conversion rates, load times, etc., and reporting
systems were to be developed accordingly. It was decided to use Accenture as their main IT
vendor for multiple reasons. Accenture had over 40 years of collaboration with SAP, and they
were the consultant for WMS’s implementation of SAP modules like FI/CO, HR (human
resources), materials management, and so on. Accenture had a big presence in their
Massachusetts office, their retail implementation of SAP system was becoming popular in the
industry, they were familiar with WMS, and top officers at WMS were satisfied with
Accenture’s performance.

FIGURE 3
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE IN 2010
It was decided that the current warehouse in New York would be moved to Sturbridge,
adjacent to the existing distribution center. The two warehouses would share inward delivery
systems but would have different picking software with different packing and shipping centers.
7
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With the two warehouses next to each other, it would be easier to share items among warehouses.
Over time, the two warehouse software systems would be merged into a single system that could
coordinate the two and connect to SAP’s material management system that was being
implemented. Ms. Smith suggested that they consider drop-shipping form US-based suppliers for
items such as leather belts, and jackets that were popular on the web as that would save time.
WMS nay even offer to these vendors their warehouse facilities for them to sell under different
labels.
To Mr. Prescott, employees’ loyalty to WMS was a major source of strength. Over their
long history many retail revolutions had happened, and WMS had always survived and come out
stronger. This was a resource that Mr. Prescott as a CEO wanted to cultivate and harness. He
knew he had to communicate in depth and communicate often on all the changes that were being
considered. He started a monthly newsletter and held periodic town hall meetings with the
employees and encouraged department managers to do likewise. They were encouraged to
identify employees who were technologically savvy and could be trained to play technology
leadership roles. Frequent training by vendors and exposure to their presentations were initiated.
The SAP implementation of FI/CO, HR, and the core fulfillment process S&D (sales and
distribution) had built a stock of experience of how to introduce major changes in the firm. Since
SAP led to no layoffs and most employees seemed to enjoy the new roles they had to adopt, it
was a positive and assuring experience Mr. Prescott wanted to build on. He had his HR staff
conduct frequent surveys to keep tabs on employee morale and their concerns.
The SAP HR module consisted of organizational units where different positions were
identified by different skill sets, experiences, and education. Mr. Prescott and Ms. Smith got a
skills inventory chart developed, and HR then worked on what the prospective chart would look
like in five years. The difference in the two charts helped identify gaps that needed to be filled.
Ms. Smith brought individual department managers into the exercise. It was hoped that in the
final document, different managers would see their own input. Workforce planning had a strong
negative connotation, and their participation would take the sting out of it, Mr. Prescott hoped.
These reports were widely circulated throughout the firm to show the employees where there
were excesses, and where new opportunities were opening. Mr. Prescott hoped that this kind of
transparency would help reduce resistance from employees when new IT systems were rolled out.
IT’s New Role
Mr. Prescott and Mr. Stingley had long discussions on the role IT would play in the new
vision of providing the best multi-channel experience in the industry. The other C-level
executives were brought into the discussion. They were impressed by Mr. Stingley’s knowledge
of multi-channel systems and knowledge about what the competition was doing. Mr. Stingley
studied IS in college and later earned an MBA from a reputed school in New York.
Senior managers recognized that IT needed to improve its visibility and adopt a more
active and prominent role in the firm. It helped that Mr. Stingley had a simple demeanor and did
not threaten to upstage the line managers with his proposals. It was agreed that IT was in the best
position in the firm to identify the technology changes that were driving the retail industry. It
was decided that Mr. Stingley would be one of the new C-level executives, making four-C level
managers in the firm: Finance, IT, Marketing, and Operations shown in Figure 3. All realized
that taking IT out from under Finance would give the IT department more teeth in the
organization and let all know that Mr. Stingley enjoyed the full support of Mr. Prescott and the
governing board. It was expected that the cultural problems would be tough for managers in IT
8
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who were used to working like utility service personnel. IT needed to become a place where
these managers were ready to help drive the company forward.
Since its inception, WMS had viewed IT as a cost center where business units dictated
what technology was to be used and when. Technology and the “data processing” department
had not been viewed as significant enough to leverage as a strategic business advantage. This
approach served WMS well until the 1990s, but IT’s role would now be more evangelical, where
the department would bring in vendors and consultants to display to WMS managers all the
possibilities that were emerging and what their competitors were adopting shown in Figure 4.
The IT department’s focus needed to change from developing software and running applications
to helping develop services in line with the corporate vision. With the new systems redefining
users’ activities, there was a high risk of user resistance and reluctance to adopt new systems,
and so ownership of new systems was transferred to the functional departments. With cloud
based SaaS (software as application services) becoming increasingly popular, WMS could
implement cutting-edge solutions without spending on hardware and software development. In
delivery of services, vendors now had to play a more prominent role.

FIGURE 4
TRANSFORMATION OF IT FUNCTION
In the new IT department, the focus of activities would evolve to include managing
multiple projects, with vendors implementing many of them.
To keep project implementation aligned with their new role, project implementation and
reporting were changed shown in Figure 5. Many of the projects were now strategic in nature.
An IT steering committee was constituted that included all four C-level executives of the firm.
Individual project managers were to report on a monthly and quarterly basis to the steering
committee. There were other stakeholders for each project, for whom roles were identified and
the communication and reporting frequency was established. For projects that were not
infrastructural in nature, like having new servers and networks, the important stakeholder was
the department that acted as “owner” of the project, and the project would now be part of their
budget. It was decided that no non-infrastructural project was to be launched until a department
was willing to bear its costs, signed on to it, and was responsible for its successful rollout. From
now on, the IT department would act like as an internal vendor to the owner department and the
primary responsibility for success would rest with the owner department. Whether executed by
9
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the WMS IT department or by vendors, projects were to adopt the agile methodology as much as
possible, because that would allow the owner and the user community to stay in the loop. Every
new prototype developed required the owner department to sign off on the current design and
development.

FIGURE 5
IT PROJECT REPORTING STRUCTURE
New Enterprise Information Architecture
In reviewing the evolving plan for a new IT platform with her four VPs for the two
divisions and the two channels, Ms. Sturgis remarked, “We will need to be the agent driving
change for achieving our new vision of delivering a unified superior experience throughout every
interaction. After all, customers, who they are, and what they want is what we know best.” With
the firm evolving toward centering on the customer and customer experience, many of the
building blocks in the IT platform would be customer focused, they all realized.
In their next monthly meeting with Mr. Stingley and his managers, there was much
curiosity as to what new software applications IT had in mind and how it would affect their work.
Mr. Stingley introduced the concept of enterprise information architecture (EIA). He described it
as a plan, a document that bridged the world of business and technology. An EIA described how
the business services were the result of a combination of IT building blocks and how the change
in business model and way of doing business needed to be foreshadowed in the EIA diagram.
Simply put, the EIA described what services IT would provide, how those services would be
generated by a combination of IT elements, where they would be located, and when they would
be implemented. So, enterprise architecture design was an activity that aligned a firm’s business
strategy with technology plans that would support it. Its documents should be able to address
both technical experts and business stakeholders and describe how technology systems
architecture help achieve business goals in in a holistic fashion. EIA facilitated management of
change by relating strategic requirements to information systems that supported them and by
linking parts of the business model to IS applications portfolio.
Stingley pointed to the diagram shown in Figure 6. “We can think of WMS as having a high-level
architecture which is comprised of three distinct architecture domains which not only rely on
one another but are stacked vertically… like this”. Stingley continued, “With this in mind we can
10
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see how our current infrastructure and architecture supports our current retail business.” At the
top level was the retail and business architecture: the business activities that constituted the firm.
On the middle layer was the data architecture: the applications that interacted with the database
on one side and with end users on the other side so that users could engage in the activities
broadly described in the top layer. On the bottom layer was the hardware: networks and servers
that allowed the second layer to perform. These were not directly visible to the user.

FIGURE 6
BASIC ARCHITECTURE DOMAIN CHART - PETER STINGLEY
In describing the top, retail and business architecture, Mr. Stingley, drew attention to their
point of sale systems and the catalog center and the call center applications which is part of the
top layer. They were served by a common information system backend with its own data
architecture and applications, the second layer. This stores backend layer connected to the
corporate systems, which were SAP based and provided the functionality for order fulfillment,
finance, accounts, human resources, etc. However, different sales channels suffered from price
discrepancies and availability figure because different channels were working off to different
versions of the data. Business channels had historically developed independently with their own
departments, budgets and managers and ended up with their own information systems that served
their specific needs the best. This resulted in a mish-mash of connections between the second
layers where the data and the business applications resided and the top layer that served the
customers and the employees that were interfacing the customers.
Stingley added, “When we have a modern architecture and infrastructure, it would be
simply a matter of enabling new communication channels within our applications through our
architecture and infrastructure. That is not always possible given our current configuration.
Essentially, in our new configuration we will have a single pipe that connects the two layers so
that the top customer facing layers are working off a single version of data. That would be
fundamental in making customers have a seamless experience as they switched from one channel
to another in their interaction cycle.
Mr. Stingley explained how the new proposed architecture would allow evolution of the
marketing function. Increasingly, customers are in a single buying experience end up using
multiple channels such as web, email, physical stores and multiple devices such as cell phone
11
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tablets and laptops. Currently, the data related to each touchpoint gets stored in different tables
and in different formats. Providing an omni-channel experience would require that a unified view
of all these touchpoints be available to the customer relationship management applications. The
SAP platform worked off a single integrated database so with the right CRM module all
interactions with the customer, including the customer’s orders, historical and pending, all the
issues raised with the customer service, all the products they have browsed can be loaded into a
single set of tables and can be made available to anybody in WMS in real time, which is known
as the 360-degree view of the customer. With the right analytics running over the data, they
could easily identify their most valuable customers, an important goal of a CRM system, and
provide them with the best services and prices.
It was the end of December 2010. The end of the first year for a new CEO is a weighty
occasion when employees and board members reflect on what was achieved and how far they
have traveled under the new leadership. Mr. Prescott reflected that WMS seemed to have
adopted the new vision: that customers’ experience cycle needed to be delightful across multiple
channels. Mr. Prescott hoped that the entire firm was now on the same page when it came to
realizing the centrality of customers and their experience in driving IT and structural changes in
the firm. Mr. Prescott liked to describe his approach as offensive-defensive in nature: offensive
in that the firm constantly scanned for new opportunities and reoriented itself to seize them, and
defensive in that it anticipated the blowback this would trigger from its stakeholders and took
steps to ameliorate it. Only time would tell if his offensive-defensive approach worked for WMS
or not.
INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL
Case Synopsis
This case study covers the evolution of an enterprise information system at a sportswear
firm. Over time, the sportswear industry has moved from a single channel to multiple channels
and is now progressing toward an omni-channel system for better serving their customers. This
required a corresponding evolution in the firm’s information technology (IT) systems. But
changes in an IT system do not work in isolation. To get the most from their new IT platform,
the firm discovered the need to redesign their organizational structure, redefine IT department’s
role, and do strategic workforce planning. The paper describes, under fictitious names, how the
firm negotiated these challenges as it moved towards a new IT platform that would enable omnichannel offering to its customers.
Learning Objectives
1.
2.
3.

Evaluate the nature of competition in an industry and identify the role information technology can play in
developing a successful competitive response.
What is entailed in installing a new IS platform? What business and organizational problems are likely to
emerge? How do you cope with them?
How does the role of an IS department change as a firm gets more technologically intensive?

Epilogue
WMS’ performance in terms of sales and market share steadily improved over time. The
lag they had in IS implementation against their principal competitors like Harper Actionwear
12
209

1532-5822-27-2-

Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies

Volume 27, Issue 2, 2021

was progressively bridged. The share of e-commerce improved to 40% which was close to
industry average but still not up to the level that Mr. Prescott had planned. To boost that share,
Mr. Prescott opened a warehouse in Ireland and commenced e-commerce operations in Europe.
The effect of Amazon on the retail sports clothing industry continued and the proportion of
market share held by the retail stores in their winter sports clothing segments continued to
decline. After much deliberation, WMS decided to use the Amazon platform. An important
proportion of those sales on Amazon were for high end products that were sourced from Europe
and were part of the lines that were also very successful in their e-commerce operations in
Europe. It seemed that for products that were available on WMS e-commerce platform in the US,
the customers preferred to shop on WMS’ web site and not on Amazon.
Case Questions
1.

Do a Porter’s five forces analysis of the sportswear retail industry. Do you think it is a profitable industry?
Why?

Porter’s five forces analysis is done at the industry level. For the winter sportswear retail industry,
this is how the five forces evaluate.
FACTORS
Rivals

Customers

Suppliers
Substitutes
New Entrants

COMMENTS
There are several who are mostly of similar size and focused on winter wear.
There is a larger retailer that also sells winter sportswear. But the emergence
of Amazon in the field has made rivalry in the industry more intense.
Some are brand sensitive which is positive for firms with strong brands. But
the ones who are price sensitive have in Amazon a new source of supply. The
younger demographics is turning towards Amazon and other e-commerce
channels
The suppliers and their agents in Asia are many and therefore have little
negotiating power
Substitutes are none for somebody interested in winter sports but pricing
beyond a certain level would make the sport less popular
For new entrants particularly, ones appearing with an e-commerce channel
there are few barriers to entry. So, this is an adverse factor

According to above qualitative study, most factors are adverse, and the profitability of the
winter sportswear industry is worsening over time. A major reason has been the emergence of ecommerce.
2.

Do a SWOT analysis of WMS beginning in 2010. What business strategy would you advise
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Opportunities

Threats
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COMMENTS
 WMS has strong brand,
 a reputation for excellent customer service,
 has employees and managers who are dedicated to the firm,
 Their IT department has developed the skillsets to implement
complex enterprise systems supplied by SAP.
 Being part of the SAP world provides them with access and skill to
implement the customer facing solutions that are emerging in that
ecosystem.
 Their information systems are not as up to date as the best in the
industry.
 The IT department is viewed as a cost center with limited role in
strategy formulation.
 WMS e-commerce venture did not prove successful showing
limitation in structure, systems and processes in the firm.
 Compared to firms like Amazon and Walmart, they are a firm with
limited resources
 Emergence of new technology platforms is much a threat as an
opportunity.
 Being ahead on the technology curve will allow WMS to provide
services that will help to differentiate them against their competitors.
 E-commerce will help them to leverage their expertise in retailing
winter sports wear into new geographies such as Asia and Europe.
 Emergence of Amazon is changing the competitive landscape in a
negative way.
 The younger demographics are more into e-commerce and using
multiple devices which WMS is yet to be able to serve

Strategy: WMS can only survive through differentiation. The strategy of differentiating
oneself through product excellence only has run its course because same sources are serving
multiple retailers. The strategy of delivering an excellent shopping experience has also run its
course as the new demographic lives and shops in the digital space. For WMS that is the space of
competition where it has to make its mark.
3.

Mr. Prescott limited himself to three factors: systems, structure, and solidarity for achieving his business
vision. What factors would you have preferred?

It is implicitly assumed that the environment in which WMS is operating will be stable and
that factors such as good economy, increasing globalization, long supply chains, etc., will all be
as it is. But they did not and in a single election cycle much changed.
While Mr. Prescott has ensured that the top management has bought into his vision, there is
little evidence in the case, that WMS is taking steps to see that change is accepted by all levels of
employees. Even the best strategy can flounder if employees do not buy into it.
Dependence on IT driven strategy brings along its own risk factors. The multidimensional skill set in multiple IT areas required of the firm is still not there. It is very hard to
retain the skilled IT employees. Changing their skill profile is a slow and challenging task.
4.

What role did IT play in Mr. Prescott’s new vision?

14
209

1532-5822-27-2-

Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies

Volume 27, Issue 2, 2021

Mr. Prescott realized that the space of competition is now the digital space. That space of
operations is now IT driven which needs to be installed, configured, and then sold to employees
who will be trained on them. The knowledge of the emerging digital solutions is primarily with
the IT vendors. That information flows from the vendors to the IT department of the firm, who
participate in configuring and installing the systems with the operational people in a way that
meets the business requirement of the firm. This knowledge within the firm moves from the IT
department to the functional departments. So, the IT department plays a critical role in acting as
a midwife for a firm adopting new ways of doing things
5.

Why did he feel the necessity of reconfiguring the IT department and its role?
In WMS, IT was treated as a cost center with the role of providing services that is expected of departments
like power or air-conditioning or HR. These departments are not into fundamentally how the firm operates.
As a new platform, the role of the visibility of IT goes up in the firm and as the platform matures that role
is reduced over time. As of now IT needs to be involved in most operational areas of the firm and that role
must be formally introduced into the structure of the firm.

The knowledge of digital solutions is generated in the vendor firms like SAP. That
knowledge diffuses to firms through their IT departments who talk the same technical language.
From the IT department, it then diffuses to user departments. The IT department needs to have
the stature to make that diffusion process effective at all layers of the management including the
C-level executive committees. During this phase when a new platform is being introduced, much
of the CaPex expenses of the firm is in the IS field. Over time as the platform matures, such
CaPex expenditures reduce and the IS department’s importance to the firm becomes less critical,
until it is time again for another new technology platform. The role and visibility of the IS
department waxes and wanes in line with life cycle stage of the IT platform.
6.

Do you think Mr. Prescott’s offensive-defensive approach would work? What actions in the case would
count as offensive and what actions would count as defensive?

It can vary.
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